The dynamics of mergers and acquisitions by Morellec, Erwan & Zhdanov, Alexei
ARTICLE IN PRESSJournal of Financial Economics 77 (2005) 649–6720304-405X/$
doi:10.1016/j
$This pap
Imperfect Inf
for helpful c
solution met
from FAME
was done wh
Rochester.
Correspo
Lausanne, Sw
E-mail adwww.elsevier.com/locate/jfecThe dynamics of mergers and acquisitions$
Erwan Morelleca,b,c,, Alexei Zhdanovd
aUniversity of Lausanne, Ecole des HEC, Route de Chavannes 33, 1007 Lausanne, Switzerland
bFAME, Switzerland
cCEPR, London, UK
dSimon School of Business, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA
Received 29 April 2003; received in revised form 22 September 2004; accepted 28 October 2004
Available online 23 June 2005Abstract
This paper presents a dynamic model of takeovers based on the stock market valuations of
merging ﬁrms. The model incorporates competition and imperfect information and determines
the terms and timing of takeovers by solving option exercise games between bidding and target
shareholders. The implications of the model for returns to stockholders are consistent with the
available evidence. In addition, the model generates new predictions relating these returns to
the drift, volatility and correlation coefﬁcient of the bidder and the target stock returns and to
the dispersion of beliefs regarding the beneﬁts of the takeover.
r 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: G13; G34
Keywords: Takeovers; Real options; Competition; Learning.- see front matter r 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
.jﬁneco.2004.10.009
er builds on a paper titled ‘‘A Dynamic Analysis of Takeover Deals with Competition and
ormation.’’ We thank Mike Barclay, Ernst-Ludwig Von Thadden, and the associate editor
omments. We also thank the referee for providing detailed comments and suggesting the
hod to the equilibrium with competition. The ﬁrst author acknowledges ﬁnancial support
and from NCCR FINRISK of the Swiss National Science Foundation. Part of this research
en Morellec was on the faculty of the Simon School of Business at the University of
nding author. University of Lausanne, Ecole des HEC, Route de Chavannes 33, 1007
itzerland. Tel.: +41 (0)21 692 3357; fax: +41 (0)21 692 3435.
dress: erwan.morellec@unil.ch (E. Morellec).
ARTICLE IN PRESS
E. Morellec, A. Zhdanov / Journal of Financial Economics 77 (2005) 649–6726501. Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions have been the subject of considerable research in
ﬁnancial economics. Yet, despite the substantial development of this literature, it is
still unclear what is the relation between the timing and the terms of takeovers or
what are the determinants of returns to shareholders in control transactions. In the
vast majority of takeover models, the timing of the takeover is set exogenously and is
independent of the negotiated terms of the takeover. The present paper develops an
equilibrium framework for the joint determination of the timing and terms of
takeovers in the presence of competition and imperfect information. This framework
is then used to derive implications regarding returns to stockholders in takeover
deals.
The model developed in the paper relies on two key elements. The ﬁrst is an
analogy between takeover opportunities and exchange options. This analogy
recognizes that takeover deals typically present participants in the deal with an
option to exchange one asset (the shares in the initial ﬁrm) for another (shares in the
new ﬁrm or cash). As shown in the paper, this ﬁrst element is sufﬁcient to generate
implications regarding the timing and the terms of takeovers. In particular, the
timing and terms of the takeover are the outcome of an option exercise game in
which each ﬁrm determines an exercise strategy for its exchange option, while taking
into account the other ﬁrms’ exercise strategies (see also Grenadier, 2002; Novy-
Marx, 2003).
The second key element of the model relates to the information set of investors.
While participating ﬁrms have complete information about the underlying
parameters of the model, outside investors have incomplete information. However,
investors can update their beliefs by observing the behavior of participating ﬁrms.
This learning process implies that outside investors can anticipate the timing and
terms of the takeover to some extent. As a result, the stock market valuations of
participating ﬁrms reﬂect the fraction of the takeover surplus that can be captured by
public information. This process also implies that as the takeover becomes more
likely, a larger fraction of the takeover surplus gets incorporated in the stock market
valuations of participating ﬁrms, thereby inducing a pre-bid runup in stock prices.
The paper also demonstrates that in equilibrium, part of the uncertainty remains
unresolved until the announcement of the takeover. Therefore, the model generates
abnormal returns to stockholders around takeover announcements.
The derivation of the results in the paper proceeds in two steps. The ﬁrst step
determines the equilibrium restructuring strategy as the solution to an option
exercise game between bidding and target shareholders. The second step
characterizes the implications of the equilibrium for abnormal returns around
takeover announcements. The model generates implications that are consistent with
the available empirical evidence and yields a number of new predictions. Notably,
the model predicts that (1) abnormal returns to target shareholders should be larger
than returns to bidding shareholders; (2) abnormal returns to bidding shareholders
can be negative if there is competition for the acquisition of the target; (3) the
probability of negative abnormal returns increases with the dispersion of beliefs
ARTICLE IN PRESS
E. Morellec, A. Zhdanov / Journal of Financial Economics 77 (2005) 649–672 651regarding the synergy created by the takeover; (4) abnormal returns to stockholders
increase with the volatility of stock returns and decrease with the correlation between
the returns of merging ﬁrms; (5) the sensitivity to the return characteristics of
merging ﬁrms is greater for abnormal returns to target shareholders; and (6)
competition speeds up the acquisition process and decreases returns to bidding
shareholders.
One important prediction of the model is that combined returns to stockholders
should be positive since takeovers create wealth in the short run. In that respect our
model differs from the hubris hypothesis developed by Roll (1986), which predicts
that acquisitions announcements should have a zero combined abnormal return since
acquisitions just result in a wealth transfer between bidding and target stockholders.
It also differs from the free cash ﬂow hypothesis of Jensen (1986), which predicts that
combined returns should be negative. Importantly, our model also allows us to relate
stockholder returns to the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and the characteristics of
stock returns. These additional predictions are unique to our model.
The analysis in the present paper relates to several articles in the literature.
Margrabe (1978) is the ﬁrst to analyze takeovers as exchange options. In his model,
the takeover involves a zero-sum game and timing is exogenous. Shleifer and Vishny
(2003) also consider a zero-sum game (in the long run) with exogenous timing. In
their framework, outside investors do not incorporate the potential surplus
associated with the takeover in the stock market valuations of participating ﬁrms.
Therefore, the announcement of a takeover generates abnormal announcement
returns. The present paper extends these models in several important dimensions.
First, the timing and the terms of the takeover are determined endogenously as the
solution to an option exercise game. Second, the model incorporates both imperfect
information and learning, thereby generating both a pre-bid runup in stock prices
and abnormal returns to bidding and target shareholders around the takeover
announcement. Finally, we examine the impact of competition on the timing and
terms of the takeover.
The paper that is most closely related to the present analysis is Lambrecht (2004).
Lambrecht also analyzes takeovers using a real options setting with endogenous
timing. One essential difference between the two papers is that his analysis relies on a
strong form of market efﬁciency. This implies that in his model the prices of the
companies move smoothly to their post-merger value and there are no abnormal
stock returns on the announcement of the takeover. Another important point of
departure is that we examine the impact of competition on the timing and terms of
takeovers. As shown in the paper, this feature is essential in generating negative
announcement returns to the bidder. Finally, we construct a two-factor model that
allows for different degrees of correlation between the bidder and target stock
returns, whereas Lambrecht considers a one factor model that mostly applies to
horizontal mergers. Our paper thus extends and complements the results derived in
Lambrecht (2004).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model of
takeovers. Section 3 analyzes the dynamics of mergers when there exists a unique
bidder. Section 4 introduces competition for the target. Section 5 concludes.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
E. Morellec, A. Zhdanov / Journal of Financial Economics 77 (2005) 649–6726522. A reduced-form model of takeovers
This section presents the basic model and derives preliminary results in a static
framework. Throughout the analysis, agents are risk-neutral and the risk-free rate r
is constant. Time is continuous and uncertainty is modeled by a complete probability
space ðO;F;PÞ.
Consider two ﬁrms with capital stocks K and Q and stock market valuations per
unit of capital B and T . Suppose that the stock market valuation of each ﬁrm has
two components. The ﬁrst component is the present value of the cash ﬂows
generated by their core businesses, denoted by X and Y . The second component is
the potential surplus associated with a control transaction, denoted by G. In
particular, we have
B ¼ X þ GBðX ; Y Þ and T ¼ Y þ GTðX ; Y Þ, (1)
where X and Y are stochastic processes with dynamics deﬁned below.
At any time t40, these two ﬁrms can negotiate a takeover deal. We follow Shleifer
and Vishny (2003) in assuming that, after the takeover, the value of equity per unit of
capital is a linear combination of pre-takeover values. In particular, the post-
takeover value of the ﬁrm is given by
V ðX ; Y Þ ¼ ðK þ QÞ½ðyþ aþ aðo 1ÞÞX þ ð1 y aÞY , (2)
where y ¼ K=ðK þ QÞ and ða;oÞ 2 R2þþ. As will become clear below, the takeover
gain increases with the synergy factor a. In addition, B and T are respectively the
bidding ﬁrm and the target ﬁrm when a is positive, which is the case considered in the
paper. We assume that a is observable to all investors. By contrast, o is only
observable to the managers of participating ﬁrms. Other market participants do not
know this value and assume that it is a random variable. Because insider trading laws
(and possibly wealth constraints) prohibit managers from trading on their inside
information, we assume that managers do not sell or buy their own stock to restore
efﬁcient pricing. Thus, the stock price reﬂects the information set of the uninformed
shareholders. Shareholders decide to accept or reject takeover bids based on the
informed manager’s recommendation. Thus, when managers recommend a takeover,
information is revealed and the stock price reacts. But an outsider does not learn
anything new simply by buying shares.
At the time of the takeover, the takeover surplus equals the value of the combined
ﬁrm minus the sum of the market values of the two ﬁrms prior to the takeover. After
simpliﬁcations, this combined surplus can be expressed as1
GCðX ; Y Þ ¼ ðK þ QÞaðoX  Y Þ. (3)1In the numerical examples below, we will assume that the true value of o is o ¼ 1. Because the
managers know that the true value of o, it does not matter whether we multiply the bidder valuation or the
target valuation by the factor o. Notably, we could assume instead that ﬁrm value satisﬁes
V ðX ; Y Þ ¼ ðK þQÞ½ðyþ aÞX þ ð1 y a aðo 1ÞÞY 
so that the combined gain is given by
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restructuring will result in a more efﬁcient allocation of resources. This speciﬁcation
is consistent with the fact that acquirers generally have higher Tobin’s q than their
target companies (see Andrade and Stafford, 2004).
The restructuring strategy selected by the participants in the deal typically depends
on the combined takeover surplus as well as its allocation among participants.
Suppose that the takeover agreement speciﬁes that a fraction x of the new ﬁrm
accrues to bidding shareholders after the takeover. (The allocation of the surplus is
determined endogenously below.) Such a restructuring opportunity presents bidding
shareholders with an option to exchange their initial shares for a fraction x of the
shares of the combined ﬁrm. It also implies that the surplus that bidding
shareholders extract from the restructuring satisﬁes xV ðX ; Y Þ  KX , or
GBðX ; Y Þ ¼ xGCðX ; Y Þ  ð1 xÞKX þ xQY , (4)
whereas the surplus accruing to target shareholders is given by
GTðX ; Y Þ ¼ ð1 xÞGCðX ; Y Þ þ ð1 xÞKX  xQY . (5)
Eq. (4) shows that the gain to the bidding ﬁrm reﬂects the combined takeover surplus
as well as the fraction x of the target ﬁrm that is transferred to bidding shareholders
and the fraction (1 x) of the bidding ﬁrm that is transferred to target shareholders.
A similar interpretation applies to (5).
The above characterization shows that the combined takeover surplus and its
allocation among participants depend on the size of the bidding and target ﬁrms, the
synergy parameter a, and the relative market valuations of the core businesses of the
two ﬁrms. The optimality of the decision to enter the takeover deal also depends on
other dimensions of the ﬁrms’ environment such as ongoing uncertainty or the ﬁrms’
ability to reverse their decisions. Below, we assume that the takeover decision is
irreversible. We also assume that ﬁrms face two sources of uncertainty.
The ﬁrst source of uncertainty relates to the cash ﬂows from the core businesses of
the two ﬁrms. In particular, we assume that the present value of these cash ﬂows is
observable and governed by the following stochastic differential equations:
dAðtÞ ¼ mAAðtÞdt þ sAAðtÞdW AðtÞ; A ¼ X ; Y , (6)
where mAor and sA40 are constant parameters and W X and W Y are standard
Brownian motions on ðO;F; PÞ. This is similar to assuming that cash ﬂows are
observable and governed by geometric Brownian motions with starting values ðr 
mX ÞX ð0Þ and ðr  mY ÞY ð0Þ. These equations imply that the growth rate of core
business valuations is normally distributed with mean mADt and variance s
2
ADt over
time interval Dt. In addition, we presume that the correlation coefﬁcient between the
two sources of uncertainty W X and W Y is constant and equal to r.(footnote continued)
GCðX ; Y Þ ¼ ðK þQÞaðX  oY Þ.
This speciﬁcation (with o in front of the bidder valuation X ) has been chosen because it allows us to
describe in a simple fashion bidder heterogeneity when we introduce competition for the target.
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magnitude of the takeover surplus. As discussed above, we consider that outside
investors cannot observe this parameter. However, they can learn about it by
observing the behavior of the two ﬁrms. We show below that, for each o, the value-
maximizing policy is to invest when the process ðRðtÞÞtX0 	 ðX ðtÞ=Y ðtÞÞtX0 ﬁrst
crosses a threshold R
ðoÞ. At the time of the restructuring, market participants can
observe the current value of the process ðRðtÞÞtX0 and infer the value of the
parameter o using the mapping o 7!R
ðoÞ. Before then, the market learns about the
value created by the takeover by observing the path of ðRðtÞÞtX0. When the process
ðRðtÞÞtX0 reaches a new peak and the ﬁrm does not invest, the market revises its
beliefs regarding the true value of o. In addition, unless o ¼ omin (where omin is the
lowest possible value for o), part of the uncertainty remains unresolved until the
announcement of the takeover. Thus, the model generates abnormal returns around
takeover announcements.3. Mergers with a single bidder
3.1. Derivation of the equilibrium
The analysis in Section 2 indicates that takeovers present participants in the deal
with an option to exchange one asset for another—that is they can exchange their
shares in the initial ﬁrm for a fraction of the shares of the combined ﬁrm. Moreover,
for any given restructuring policy, the takeover surplus depends on the synergy
parameters o and a and the relative valuations of the bidding and target ﬁrms’ core
businesses. Because o and a are presumed to be constant, the value-maximizing
restructuring policy can be characterized by deﬁning a function pðX Þ that represents,
for every value of Y , a value for X above which the two ﬁrms should merge. The
value of the option to merge, denoted by OðX ; Y Þ, is thus a function of the
contemporaneous values of X and Y and the value-maximizing restructuring policy.
The analogy between takeover opportunities and exchange options suggests that
the timing of takeover deals is determined by the restructuring strategy that
maximizes the value of the exchange option. When analyzing the timing of mergers,
however, it is also important to recognize that each participant has the opportunity
to enter into the restructuring agreement and has to determine an exercise strategy
for its exchange option. This exercise strategy depends on the combined surplus
associated with the restructuring and its sharing among participants. Thus, the
timing of the restructuring results from a strategic equilibrium in which each ﬁrm
determines an optimal strategy, while taking into account other ﬁrms’ exercise
strategies.
Consider ﬁrst the exercise strategy of the bidder. Using standard arguments, it is
possible to show that the value of the bidder’s restructuring option, denoted by
OBðX ; Y Þ, solves the following partial differential equation (see the appendix):
1
2
s2X X
2OBXX þ rsXsY XYOBXY þ 12s2Y Y 2OBYY þ mX XOBX þ mY YOBY ¼ rOB, (7)
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order) partial derivative of H with respect to x. The right-hand side of Eq. (7)
represents the required rate of return on the option to merge. The left-hand side is
equal to the expected return on this option due to changes in the values of the state
variables X and Y .
Eq. (7) is solved subject to the following boundary conditions:
OBðX ; Y ÞjX¼pBðY Þ ¼ xV ðX ; Y ÞjX¼pBðY Þ  KpBðY Þ, (8)
OBX ðX ; Y ÞjX¼pBðY Þ ¼ xV X ðX ; Y ÞjX¼pBðY Þ  K , (9)
OBY ðX ; Y ÞjX¼pBðY Þ ¼ xV Y ðX ; Y ÞjX¼pBðY Þ. (10)
The value-matching (8) imposes an equality between the value of the restructuring
option and the payoff of the option upon exercise. Thus, the value of the
restructuring option equals, at the time of the takeover, the surplus that bidding
shareholders extract from the restructuring. The smooth-pasting conditions (9) and
(10) ensure that the restructuring occurs along the optimal path by requiring a
continuity of the slopes at the trigger threshold. An additional boundary condition is
given by requiring that, as the ratio of the two stock prices decreases, the ratio of the
option value to the stock price approaches zero:
lim
ðX=Y Þ!0
OBðX ; Y Þ
X
¼ 0. (11)
Eq. (8) reveals that the payoff of the restructuring option is linear in X and Y .
Thus, the bidder’s exercise strategy can be described using the ratio of these two state
variables: R 	 X=Y . In addition, the time-homogeneity of the problem allows us to
conclude that the optimal restructuring policy is described by a constant threshold
R
 at (and above) which it will be optimal to merge. The appendix provides a
derivation of the value of the bidder’s restructuring option. This value satisﬁes
OBðX ; Y Þ ¼ Y ½xV ðR; 1Þ  KR R
R
B
 b
, (12)
in which the restructuring threshold selected by bidding shareholders is given by
R
B ¼
b
b 1
x½ðK þ QÞa Q
x½K þ aoðK þ QÞ  K (13)
and b denotes the positive root of the following familiar quadratic equation:
1
2
ðs2X  2rsXsY þ s2Y Þbðb 1Þ þ ðmX  mY Þb r ¼ 0. (14)
Importantly, because R is deﬁned on Rþþ, ðK þ QÞaXQ is a necessary condition for
bidding shareholders to participate in the deal. In addition, when this condition is
satisﬁed, we have
qR
B
qx
¼ K ½ðK þ QÞa Q½xðK þ aoðK þ QÞÞ  K 2p0. (15)
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shareholders extract from the restructuring, the greater are their incentives to
participate in the deal. The inequality also highlights an essential difference between
the present model and traditional models of takeovers such as Grossman and Hart
(1980). In traditional models, the ‘‘timing’’ dimension of the investment decision is
typically overlooked and the logical conclusion of the analysis is that it is optimal for
target shareholders to hold up the bidder until all the improvement in value is paid to
them. In the present model, the timing of the offer depends on the negotiated terms
of the offer and hence, when determining these terms, shareholders have to make a
tradeoff between a greater surplus later or a lower surplus now.
The exercise strategy of the target can be derived in a similar fashion. The value of
the option to merge for the target is given by
OTðX ; Y Þ ¼ fY ½ð1 xÞV ðR; 1Þ  Qg R
R
T
 b
, (16)
in which the restructuring threshold selected by target shareholders satisﬁes
R
T ¼
b
b 1
xQ þ ð1 xÞaðK þ QÞ
ð1 xÞ½ðK þ QÞaoþ K  . (17)
The above set of equations can be interpreted as follows. Eqs. (12) and (16) give
the value of the option to merge for the bidder and the target, respectively. The ﬁrst
term on the right-hand side of these equations accounts for the surplus associated
with the takeover. The second term represents the present value of one dollar
contingent on the restructuring. Thus, this second term reﬂects both the probability
that the takeover occurs and the timing of the takeover. Eqs. (13) and (17) give the
restructuring thresholds selected by the bidder and the target. The second term on
the right-hand side of these equations gives the ratio of the stock prices R above
which the restructuring generates a positive surplus (for a given sharing rule for
the value of the reorganized ﬁrm). Finally, the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of
Eqs. (13) and (17) captures the ‘‘option value’’ associated with uncertainty.
The above developments demonstrate that, for any given sharing rule, each ﬁrm
can determine the restructuring policy that maximizes the surplus it extracts from the
takeover. Given the properties of the combined surplus, the optimal exercise policies
take the form of trigger policies described by Eqs. (13) and (17). In equilibrium, the
negotiated outcome of the merger satisﬁes the constraint R
B ¼ R
T, which determines
the allocation of the surplus between ﬁrms. We then have the following result.
Proposition 1. The value-maximizing restructuring policy for participating firms is to
merge when the ratio of core business valuations R 	 X=Y reaches the cutoff level
R
 ¼ b
oðb 1Þ . (18)
The share of the combined firm accruing to the bidder is given by
x ¼ K
K þ oQ . (19)
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because the takeover surplus increases with o, the threshold R
 decreases with o.
(The dependency of R
 on o implies that there is learning in equilibrium.) This in
turn implies that the likelihood of a control transaction over a given time interval
½0; T  increases with o.2 Consider, for example, an environment in which X=Y ¼ 2,
the risk-free interest rate is r ¼ 0:1, the drifts of cash ﬂows from the core business
valuations are mX ¼ 0:03 and mY ¼ 0:01, the correlation coefﬁcient between core
business valuations is sX ¼ sY ¼ 0:2, and the correlation coefﬁcient between core
business valuations r ¼ 0:25. When the synergy of the restructuring increases from
o ¼ 1 to 1.25, the likelihood of a takeover over a ﬁve-year period increases from
49.1% to 86%.
Second, the equilibrium restructuring threshold R
 depends on the growth rate
and volatility of cash ﬂows from the ﬁrms’ core businesses as well as the degree of
consolidation of the merger (correlation coefﬁcient). In particular, holding their
covariance ﬁxed, a greater variance for the changes in X and Y implies more
uncertainty over their ratio, and hence an increased incentive to wait. Holding their
variances ﬁxed, a greater covariance between the changes in X and Y implies less
uncertainty over their ratio, and hence a reduced incentive to wait. These effects are
depicted in Fig. 1, which plots the restructuring threshold as a function of the growth
rate and volatility of participating ﬁrms’ core business valuations, and the
correlation coefﬁcient between these valuations.3.2. Imperfect information and announcement returns
We now turn to the implications of the model for abnormal announcement returns
to stockholders in takeover deals. These returns are equal to the unexpected
component of the surplus accruing to shareholders divided by equity value at the
time of the takeover. Within the present model, this unexpected component arises
because market participants have incomplete information regarding the takeover
surplus. However, at the time of the announcement, this uncertainty is resolved by
observing the value of the trigger threshold R
ðoÞ and the equilibrium allocation of
the surplus x. This is similar in spirit to the analysis in Grenadier (1999) and
Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003) where agents infer the private information of other
agents through their observed exercise strategies.
To better understand the dynamics of abnormal returns, we can rewrite Eq. (18) as
o ¼ oðR
Þ 	 b
R
ðb 1Þ . (20)2The probability of takeover over a time interval ½0; T  satisﬁes
P sup
0ptpt
RðtÞXR

 
¼N  lnðR

=R0Þ þ bT
sR
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
T
p
 
þ R
R

 ð2mRs2RÞ=s2R
N
 lnðR
=R0Þ  bT
sR
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
T
p
 
,
where b ¼ ðmR  s2R=2Þ=sR and N is the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
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Fig. 1. Restructuring threshold in merger agreements. Plots the selected restructuring threshold in merger
agreements as a function of the growth rate and volatility of cash ﬂows from the core businesses of the two
ﬁrms and the correlation coefﬁcient between changes in these cash ﬂows. Input parameter values are set as
in the base case environment.
E. Morellec, A. Zhdanov / Journal of Financial Economics 77 (2005) 649–672658This equation indicates that there exists a negative, monotonic relation between the
restructuring point and the identiﬁed synergy. Thus, by observing the behavior of the
two ﬁrms—and in particular whether the two ﬁrms exercise their option when R
reaches a new peak—the market can update its beliefs regarding the value of o.
To determine the implications of the model for abnormal returns, we assume that
the prior distribution of o is uniform with sample space f1 so; 1; 1þ sog so that
each outcome can occur with equal probability. This assumption implies that its
posterior distribution at any time t is also uniform. Denote by t the time of the
takeover announcement and assume that o ¼ 1. Just before the takeover
announcement, we have
sup
spt
Rs4R
ð1þ soÞ ¼ bð1þ soÞðb 1Þ
(so that investors know that oa1þ so) and we can write the value of the bidding
ﬁrm as (using Y as nume´raire)
BðtÞ ¼ KRðtÞ þ 12½OBðRðtÞ; 1; 1Þ þ OBðRðtÞ; 1; 1 soÞ, (21)
where OBðR; 1; xÞ is the value of the bidder’s option to merge conditional on o ¼ x.
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of Eq. (21) represents the value of the bidding
ﬁrm core business. The second term reﬂects the potential gain associated with a
takeover for bidding shareholders.
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½xV ðR
; 1Þ  KR
X1
2
½OBðR
; 1; 1Þ þ OBðR
; 1; 1 soÞ, (22)
for all tpt, where R
 is deﬁned in Proposition 1. This inequality implies positive
abnormal announcement stock returns to bidding shareholders in the basic model.
In particular, these abnormal announcement returns satisfy
ARðtÞ ¼
1
2
½OBðR
; 1; 1Þ  OBðR
; 1; 1 soÞ
BðtÞ
. (23)
Fig. 2 plots abnormal announcement returns as a function of the growth rate and
volatility of the participating ﬁrms’ cash ﬂows and the degree of consolidation of the
merger (correlation coefﬁcient). In the ﬁgure, the solid line represents abnormal0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
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Fig. 2. Abnormal returns in merger announcements. Plots abnormal returns to shareholders in merger
agreements as a function of the growth rate and volatility of cash ﬂows from the core businesses of the two
ﬁrms and the correlation coefﬁcient between changes in these cash ﬂows. Input parameter values are set as
in the base case environment. In this ﬁgure, the solid line represents returns to bidding shareholders, and
the dashed line represents returns to target shareholders.
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target shareholders.
Because the timing of the merger depends on the growth rate and volatility of the
ﬁrms’ core business valuations and the degree of consolidation of the merger,
abnormal returns to shareholders depend on these factors as well. In particular, the
model predicts that returns to bidding and target shareholders should (1) decrease
with the degree of consolidation of the merger and the growth rate of the target’s
core business valuation and (2) increase with volatility and the growth rate of the
bidder’s core business valuation. These effects are depicted in Fig. 2, which also
shows that abnormal returns to target shareholders typically exceed abnormal
returns to bidding shareholders (the appendix shows that it is always the case when
the bidding ﬁrm is larger than the target or KXQ). Finally, it should be noted that
without competition, returns to bidding shareholders are always positive, which is
inconsistent with the available evidence. We show below that competition and
imperfect information can generate negative abnormal announcement returns, even
when agents have rational expectations.
3.3. Central-planning formulation
One interesting feature of the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 is that it can
be formulated as a surplus-maximization problem for a central planner. The
objective of the planner is to determine the restructuring policy that maximizes the
combined surplus
GCðX ; Y Þ ¼ ðK þ QÞaðoX  Y Þ. (24)
Using similar arguments as above, it is possible to show that the surplus-maximizing
policy is identical to the restructuring policy described in Proposition 1 (see the
appendix). Thus, the restructuring policy associated with the merger coincides with
the one that would be chosen by a surplus-maximizing planner. This suggests that
the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 can be derived by ﬁrst determining a
sharing rule for the takeover surplus and then selecting the timing that maximizes
this surplus. The only renegotiation-proof allocation under that scenario is the one
described in Proposition 1.4. Introducing competition
4.1. Competition and the timing of takeovers
In this section, we extend the analysis by considering that two potential acquirers
that differ in terms of synergy beneﬁt o can compete for the target. (In the appendix,
we examine the timing of takeovers when ﬁrms differ in terms of a and o.)
Introducing competition among multiple bidders impacts the mechanism determin-
ing the equilibrium timing and terms of the takeover. One essential difference from
the case of a single bidder is the decay in the bidders’ bargaining power due to
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position and allows target shareholders to extract a higher premium from the
bidding ﬁrms.
To determine the timing and terms of the takeover, we ﬁrst examine the
optimization problem of bidding shareholders. Once the takeover contest is initiated,
both bidders submit their bids to the target in the form of the fraction of the new
ﬁrm’s equity to be owned by target shareholders upon the takeover consumation.
The maximum value of that fraction, or the maximum price that a bidder is willing
to pay to acquire the target, makes the bidder indifferent between winning and losing
the takeover contest. The bidder never places a bid in excess of that value, since it
would be better to lose the contest and let the other bidder acquire the target. Denote
by Ki the size of bidder i and assume that both bidders belong to the same industry
so that their cash ﬂows are driven by the same process X .3 Then the breakeven stake
of bidder i is the solution to
xbeiV ðX ; Y ;oiÞ  KiX ¼ 0()xbei ¼
KiX
V ðX ; Y ;oiÞ
; i ¼ 1; 2.
Assume that we adopt a Nash equilibrium and denote by xi the ownership share
that bidder i would obtain if it were the only bidder. Then the reaction function of
bidder 1 can be deﬁned as follows:1.3
bid
cor
do
thaSuppose that V ðX ; Y ;o1Þ4V ðX ; Y ;o2Þ. Then bidder 1 is the stronger of the two
and wins the takeover contest. Depending on the current value of the ratio of the
stochastic processes R ¼ X=Y and the asymmetry between the synergy
parameters o1 and o2, two different scenarios are possible:
(a) The value associated with the equilibrium share offered to target shareholders
is greater than the breakeven value of the weaker bidder:
ð1 xbe2ÞV ðX ; Y ;o2Þoð1 x1ÞV ðX ; Y ;o1Þ,
where x1 can be obtained by solving (13) for x1:
x1 ¼
K1R
RðK1 þ ao1ðK1 þ QÞÞ  ½b=ðb 1ÞðaðK1 þ QÞ  QÞ
.
In this case bidder 2 is too weak to matter, as it drops out of takeover contests
at bid values below that of the equilibrium bid of the stronger bidder.
Therefore, the equilibrium terms of the takeover will be the same as in the case
of a single bidder.
(b) The value associated with the equilibrium share offered to target shareholders
is lower than the breakeven value of the weaker bidder:
ð1 xbe2ÞV ðX ; Y ;o2Þ4ð1 x1ÞV ðX ; Y ;o1Þ.Exte
der)
relat
not r
t havnding the model to incorporate a third stochastic process (one for the target and one for each
would not add many new economic insights. Indeed, we already capture heterogeneity by using a
ion coefﬁcient that is less than one between X and Y . Moreover, most of the results in this section
ely on the speciﬁc dynamics of the stochastic processes governing cash ﬂows from assets in place so
ing one or two processes would not change anything.
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its equilibrium stake to target shareholders, just as in the case with no
competition, then bidder 2 has an incentive to outbid, as it will be better off by
winning the contest. This incentive disappears once the bid value reaches the
breakeven threshold of bidder 2. Therefore, bidder 1 has to keep an ownership
stake in the combined ﬁrm such that the value to the target of dealing with
bidder 1 is not less than that of dealing with bidder 2. Denote this stake by
x1max. Then bidder 1 has no incentive to keep a stake that is lower than x1max
by any material amount. By offering 1 x1max þ  bidder 1 is able to ward off
competition, since any bid in excess of 1 x1max makes bidder 2 strictly better
off by dropping out of the auction. Since  can be made arbitrarily small, we
do not take it into consideration and the equilibrium share of the bidder is
x1max.In th
der 2
take2. Suppose that V ðX ; Y ;o2Þ4V ðX ; Y ;o1Þ. Then bidder 2 is the stronger of the two
and wins the takeover contest. As above, two different scenarios are possible
depending on the current value of the ratio of the stochastic processes R ¼ X=Y
and the asymmetry between bidder characteristics.
Suppose that V ðX ; Y ;oiÞ4V ðX ; Y ;ojÞ. The above argument implies that when
there is competition, the winning bidder requires an ownership fraction that is no
higher (and possibly lower) than in the absence of competition. Thus, the downward-
sloping reaction function Rðminðxi; ximaxÞÞ coincides (case a) or lies below (case b) the
reaction function under no competition. It follows that the intersection with the
target’s upward-sloping reaction function RTðxÞ shifts to the left along the target’s
reaction function, i.e., it occurs at a threshold value of R not higher (and possibly
lower) than in the case with one bidder. Denote by Rbej the ratio of core business
valuations for which the breakeven share of the losing bidder (bidder j) is equal to
the equilibrium share of the target. This ratio solves the nonlinear equation
ximax ¼
ðb 1ÞR½ðK þ QÞaoi þ K   baðK þ QÞ
ðb 1ÞR½ðK þ QÞaoi þ K  þ b½Q  aðK þ QÞ
, (25)
where the right-hand side of this equation has been obtained by solving (17) for xT.
We then have the following result.4
Proposition 2. Competition for the target firm speeds up the takeover process and
erodes the ownership stake of bidding shareholders. When there is competition and
V ðX ; Y ;oiÞ4V ðX ; Y ;ojÞ, the takeover takes place the first time the ratio of core
business valuations ðRtÞtX0 ¼ ðX t=Y tÞtX0 reaches the threshold R
 defined by
R
 ¼ min½Ri; Rbej ,
where R
 ¼ Ri defined in (18) when the losing bidder is weak and R
 ¼ Rbej defined in
(25) when the losing bidder is strong. Moreover, the share of the combined firme appendix we show that when a1aa2, there exists a critical point R such that if Ro ð4ÞR then
(1) is stronger. Consequently, the value of R at the start of the game determines which bidder wins
over. We thank the referee for suggesting this point to us.
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x ¼ min KR

 þ ðK þ QÞaðoi  ojÞR

V ðR
; 1;oiÞ
;
K
K þ oiQ
 
,
where the min function takes a value equal to its first argument when competition
erodes the ownership share of bidding shareholders and a value equal to its second
argument otherwise.
Fig. 3 illustrates this result by providing the reaction functions of the bidder and
the target for different parameter values. The dashed line represents the reaction
function of bidder 1 if there is no competition and the dotted line represents the share
in the combined entity corresponding to the breakeven value of the second bidder.
The reaction function of the target is provided by the solid line. In this ﬁgure we
presume that o1 ¼ 1. In addition, we have o2 ¼ 0:6 in 3a (weak second bidder) and
o2 ¼ 0:95 in 3b (strong second bidder).2 2.5 3 3.5 4
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Fig. 3. Reaction function of bidding and target shareholders. Plots the reaction function of bidding and
target shareholders when there is competition among bidders. Input parameter values are set as in the base
case. The dashed line represents the reaction function of bidder 1 if there is no competition while the
dotted line represents the share in the combined entity corresponding to the breakeven value of the second
bidder. The reaction function of the target is provided by the solid line. In this ﬁgure we presume that
o1 ¼ 1. In addition, we have o2 ¼ 0:6 in (a) (weak second bidder) and o2 ¼ 0:95 in (b) (strong second
bidder).
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Fig. 3a), the equilibrium is unaffected by competition. However, when the second
bidder is sufﬁciently strong (Fig. 3b), the winning bidder has to pay the value of the
breakeven share of bidder 2. This shifts its reaction curve downwards and speeds up
the takeover. For example, in Fig. 3b the takeover threshold drops from 2.72 to 2.45
and the probability of takeover over a ﬁve-year horizon increases from 49.1% to
65%. When the two bidders are identical, their breakeven values coincide and target
shareholders are able to extract the whole takeover surplus. In this case, the takeover
is always accelerated, since for any given R, the winning bidder has to offer a higher
share to the target than it would absent competition.
4.2. Competition and announcement returns
As in Section 3, abnormal announcement returns are equal to the unexpected
component of the surplus accruing to shareholders divided by equity value at the time
of the takeover. When there is competition for the target, this unexpected component
arises for two reasons. First, market participants have incomplete information
regarding the takeover surplus. Second, in the case of multiple bidders, market
participants typically cannot identify the winning bidder before the takeover
announcement. Therefore, at any date outside investors determine each bidder’s
probability of winning. These probabilities are updated as new information arrives. At
the time of the takeover announcement, uncertainty is partially (or totally) resolved
by observing the value of the trigger threshold R
ðoÞ and the equilibrium bid.
To characterize abnormal returns in a simple fashion, we consider that K1 ¼
K2 ¼ K and a1 ¼ a2 ¼ a. In addition, we presume that the prior beliefs of outside
investors are that the oi are independent and uniformly distributed on
foimin;oiav;oimaxg; i ¼ 1; 2.5 As outside investors observe the investment behavior
of participating ﬁrms, they update their beliefs regarding the possible values of the
oi. At the time of the takeover, abnormal returns to shareholders typically depend
on the remaining uncertainty. Three cases are possible.1.5
f ðo
wh
me
supo2maxoo1min. In this case, outside investors know at the beginning that the target
will merge with bidder 1. However, the value of bidder 1’s option to merge and the
equilibrium takeover surplus are uncertain. Abnormal announcement returns to
bidder 1 can be either positive or negative, depending on the dispersion of beliefs
regarding the synergy value created in the takeover.2. o2max4o1min and minðx1; x1maxÞ ¼ x1. In this case, the outcome of the takeover
contest is not known initially. By observing the behavior of the ﬁrms before theWhen o is drawn from a probability distribution F ðoÞ with continuous probability density function
Þ, outside investors update their beliefs about the distribution as follows:
f ðojRsupðtÞÞ ¼ f ðoÞ
1 f ðoðRsupðtÞÞÞ and F ðojR
supðtÞÞ ¼ F ðoÞ  F ðoðR
supðtÞÞÞ
1 F ðoðRsupðtÞÞÞ ,
ere RsupðtÞ 	 sup0psptRðsÞ and oðRsupðtÞÞ 	 I ½R
ðoÞjR
ðoÞ ¼ RsupðtÞ, where Ið:Þ inverts R
ðoÞ,
aning that I ½R
ðoÞ ¼ o for all o. Assuming a ‘‘prior’’ support ½omin;omax for o, the ‘‘posterior’’
port of beliefs is given at any time t by ½omin;minðomax;oðRsupðtÞÞÞ.
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E. Morellec, A. Zhdanov / Journal of Financial Economics 77 (2005) 649–672 665takeover, investors may be able to infer the identity of the winning bidder. At the
time of the takeover, investors learn both that bidder 1 is the winning bidder and
the value of the synergy parameter o1. Again, abnormal announcement returns to
bidder 1 can be either positive or negative.3. o2max4o1min and minðx1; x1maxÞ ¼ x1max. This case is similar to case 2 except that
bidder 1 offers a stake corresponding to the breakeven value of bidder 2.
As in the case of a single bidder, we denote by t the time of the takeover
announcement. The expected value of the bidder before the announcement is
B1ðtÞ ¼ XK þ Et½1o14o2OBðX ; Y ;o1Þ. (26)
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of this equation is the value of the bidder’s core
business. The second term represents the expected present value of the takeover
surplus. Since we assume a ﬁnite set of possible realizations for the pairs ðo1;o2Þ and
different pairs generally result in different takeover thresholds, investors learn the
values of both o1 and o2 by observing the takeover threshold. Therefore,
Eðo1jx1maxÞ ¼ o1 and the value of the share of bidder 1’s shareholders just after
the takeover announcement becomes
B1ðtÞ ¼ X ½K þ aðo1  o2ÞðK þ QÞ. (27)
Abnormal returns to bidding shareholders at the time of the takeover announcement
are then deﬁned as: ARBðtÞ ¼ ðBðtÞ  BðtÞÞ=BðtÞ.
Using Eqs. (26) and (27), we see that takeover deals can entail either positive or
negative returns to bidder 1. The sign of the returns depends on the difference in true
synergy parameters. For example, if the two bidders are identical, uncertainty in
market beliefs always generates negative abnormal returns around announcements.
Indeed, in this case a bidder’s option to merge is worthless in (27). However, the
market’s expectation of this option is positive in (26). In general, when the difference
in synergy parameters is small, so is the premium that accrues to bidder 1 at the time
of the takeover. If the uncertainty in market beliefs is high (high o2max  o2min),
then the market’s (conditional) expectation of the merger beneﬁts might exceed its
true value. Therefore, the market overestimates the beneﬁts of the merger to bidder 1
and we observe negative abnormal returns to bidder 1 at the takeover
announcement.6 If the difference between o1 and o2 is large, then the true valueFor example, assume that s1 ¼ 0; s240, and o2  s2oo2oo1oo2 þ s2: If by the time of the
eover the pair (o1;o2 þ s2Þ is ruled out, then the value of the bidding ﬁrm before the takeover
ouncement is
BðtÞ ¼ KRðtÞ þ 12½OBðRðtÞ;o1;o2Þ þ OBðRðtÞ;o1;o2  s2Þ.
is implies that abnormal returns satisfy
ARðtÞ ¼
1
2
½OBðR
;o1;o2Þ  OBðR
;o1;o2  s2Þ
BðtÞ
o0
ce the winning bidder pays the breakeven value corresponding to o2, which is higher than the one
responding to o2  s2.
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Fig. 4. Abnormal announcement returns to bidding shareholders. Plots abnormal announcement returns
to the winning bidder as a function of the dispersion of beliefs about the synergy parameter of bidder 2,
so2 , for the standard set of input parameters. The synergy parameter of the stronger bidder is set equal to
o1 ¼ 1 and its volatility is set equal to so2 ¼ 0:1. The synergy parameter of the weaker bidder is given by
o2 ¼ 1 in (a) so that abnormal returns are always negative. The synergy parameter of the weaker bidder is
given by o2 ¼ 0:95 (solid line) or o2 ¼ 0:9 (dashed line) in (b) so that abnormal returns can be either
positive (low dispersion of beliefs) or negative (high dispersion of beliefs).
E. Morellec, A. Zhdanov / Journal of Financial Economics 77 (2005) 649–672666of bidder 1’s option to merge is higher than its expectation. In that case, abnormal
announcement returns to bidding shareholders are positive.
The model, therefore, predicts that with competition and imperfect information,
the sign (and the magnitude) of the abnormal returns to the winner of the takeover
contest depends on the degree of asymmetry between bidders. Low asymmetry
implies negative returns; high asymmetry implies positive returns. Obviously,
abnormal announcement returns also depend on the magnitude of uncertainty
related to synergy parameters. Let so2 be a measure of the dispersion of investors’
beliefs about the synergy gain of bidder 2 so that o2min ¼ o2  so2 and
o2max ¼ o2 þ so2. Fig. 4 plots abnormal announcement returns to bidding
shareholders as a function of so2 for different values of o1 and o2.
Consistent with the above discussion, Fig. 4a reveals that when the two bidders are
identical, abnormal returns to bidder 1 are always negative. In this case the bidders
compete all the rents associated with the merger away. Moreover, high uncertainty in
beliefs about bidder 2, so2; leads to a high magnitude of abnormal returns to bidder
1. Fig. 4b illustrates the following two additional points. First, as the magnitude of
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crease and can become positive (for lower values of so2). In addition, these abnormal
returns decrease with the dispersion of beliefs regarding the synergy parameter of the
weaker bidder and can become again negative as so2 becomes larger.
Consider next the returns to target shareholders. When the second bidder is too
weak to matter, the timing and terms of the takeover are not affected by competition.
As a result, abnormal returns to target shareholders are similar to those derived in
Section 3. When competition erodes the bargaining power of bidding shareholders,
the terms of the takeover to target shareholders are improved. As a result, their
returns remain positive and larger than the abnormal returns to bidding share-
holders. Moreover, and as in the case of the single bidder, the reaction function of the
target in Fig. 3 increases with the degree of consolidation of the merger and the
growth rate of the target’s core business valuation and decreases with volatility and
the growth rate of the bidder’s core business valuation. In the case of the weak
second bidder, this effect is augmented by a shift in the opposite direction of the
equilibrium reaction function x1 of bidding shareholders. As a result, abnormal
returns to target shareholders should (1) decrease with the degree of consolidation of
the merger and the growth rate of the target’s core business valuation and (2) increase
with volatility and the growth rate of the bidder’s core business valuation (Fig. 5).
These results are consistent with empirical evidence reported by Schwert (2000)
and Andrade et al. (2001) that returns to target shareholders around the takeover
announcement typically are positive whereas returns to bidding shareholders0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
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Fig. 5. Abnormal returns to target shareholders around merger announcements. Plots abnormal returns
to target shareholders around merger announcements when the synergy parameter of the stronger bidder is
set equal to o1 ¼ 1 and its volatility is set equal to so1 ¼ 0:1. The synergy parameter of the weaker bidder
is given by o2 ¼ 0:95 and its volatility is set equal to so2 ¼ 0:2, so that abnormal returns to bidding
shareholders are negative.
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consistent with the empirical evidence even though agents have rational expecta-
tions. In particular, the analysis reveals that negative announcement returns to
bidding shareholders can arise simply because of the difﬁculty of estimating the
potential synergies generated by the control transaction. We show that if beliefs are
sufﬁciently dispersed and the two potential bidders have similar characteristics,
returns will be negative. The additional implications of the model regarding
abnormal announcement returns are novel and provide further opportunity for
empirical research.5. Conclusion
This paper develops a dynamic model of takeovers that jointly determines the
timing and the terms of takeovers. The model makes an analogy between
restructuring opportunities and exchange options. The analysis in the paper also
recognizes the role of the strategic interaction between participants to the deal and
derives equilibrium restructuring strategies by solving option exercise games between
bidding and target shareholders. The model incorporates imperfect information,
learning, and competition and shows how all three elements interact to determine
abnormal returns to stockholders around takeover announcements.
The returns associated with the equilibrium restructuring strategies derived in the
paper are consistent with empirical evidence. Speciﬁcally, the model predicts that (1)
returns to target shareholders should be larger than returns to bidding shareholders,
(2) returns to bidding shareholders can be negative if there is competition for the
acquisition of the target and uncertainty regarding the synergy of the takeover, and
(3) competition among heterogeneous ﬁrms affects returns in takeover deals and
speeds up the acquisition process. In addition, the paper generates new predictions
relating abnormal returns to bidding and target shareholders to the drift, volatility,
and correlation coefﬁcient of the bidder and target stock returns.Appendix A. Timing and terms of the merger
Denote the value of the bidder’s restructuring option by OBðX ; Y Þ. In the region
for the two state variables where there is no takeover, the instantaneous change in
the value of the option to merge satisﬁes (by an application of Itoˆ’s lemma)
dOB ¼ dXOBX þ dYOBY þ ½12s2X X 2OBXX þ rsXsY XYOBXY þ 12s2Y Y 2OBYY dt.
(A.1)
The equilibrium expected return on the restructuring option is r. Combining this
equilibrium condition with Eq. (A.1) gives the partial differential equation
rOB ¼ mX XOBX þ mY YOBY þ 12s2XX X 2OBXX þ rsXsY XYOBXY þ 12s2Y Y 2OBYY ,
(A.2)
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OBðX ; Y ÞjX¼pBðY Þ ¼ xV ðX ; Y ÞjX¼pBðY Þ  KpBðY Þ, (A.3)
OBX ðX ; Y ÞjX¼pBðY Þ ¼ xV X ðX ; Y ÞjX¼pBðY Þ  K , (A.4)
OBY ðX ; Y ÞjX¼pBðY Þ ¼ xV Y ðX ; Y ÞjX¼pBðY Þ, (A.5)
and the boundary condition
lim
ðX=Y Þ!0
OBðX ; Y Þ
X
¼ 0. (A.6)
The value function OBðX ; Y Þ is linearly homogeneous in X and Y . Thus, the
optimal restructuring policy can be described using the ratio of the two stock prices:
R ¼ X=Y . Also, the value of the restructuring option can be written as
OBðX ; Y Þ ¼ YOBðX=Y ; 1Þ ¼ YOBðRÞ. (A.7)
Successive differentiation gives
OBX ðX ; Y Þ ¼ OBRðRÞ, (A.8)
OBY ðX ; Y Þ ¼ OBðRÞ  ROBRðRÞ, (A.9)
OBXX ðX ; Y Þ ¼ OBRðRÞ=Y , (A.10)
OBXY ðX ; Y Þ ¼ ROBRRðRÞ=Y , (A.11)
OBYY ðX ; Y Þ ¼ R2OBRRðRÞ=Y . (A.12)
Substituting (A.7)–(A.12) in the partial differential (A.2) and boundary (A.3)–(A.6)
yields the ordinary differential equation (using Y as nume´raire)
1
2
s2RR
2OBRR þ mRROBR ¼ ðr  mY ÞOB (A.13)
with the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions
OðR
Þ ¼ xV ðR; 1Þ  KR, (A.14)
ORðR
Þ ¼ xV RðR; 1Þ  K , (A.15)
as well as the no-bubbles condition
lim
R!0
OBðRÞ ¼ 0. (A.16)
The general solution to Eq. (A.14) is given by
OBðRÞ ¼ ARb þ BRg, (A.17)
where A and B are positive constants and b and g are, respectively, the positive and
negative roots of the quadratic equation
1
2
s2Rfðf 1Þ þ mRf r þ mj ¼ 0. (A.18)
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ARb ¼ xV ðR; 1Þ  KR and bARb1 ¼ xVRðR; 1Þ  K . (A.19)
Rearranging these equations gives
A ¼ ðR
Þb½xV ðR; 1Þ  KR and R
 ¼ b
b 1
x½ðK þ QÞa Q
x½K þ aoðK þ QÞ  K .
(A.20)
Appendix B. Central-planning formulation
One interesting feature of the Nash equilibrium described in Proposition 1 is that
it can be formulated as a surplus-maximization problem for a central planner. The
objective of the planner is to determine the restructuring policy that maximizes the
combined surplus GCðX ; Y Þ. The value of the restructuring option for the central
planner, denoted by OPðX ; Y Þ, satisﬁes the partial differential equation
rOP ¼ mX XOPX þ mY YOPY þ 12s2XX X 2OPXX þ rsXsY XYOPXY þ 12s2Y Y 2OPYY ,
(B.1)
subject to the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions
OPðX ; Y ÞjX¼pBðY Þ ¼ GCðX ; Y ÞjX¼pPðY Þ, (B.2)
OPX ðX ; Y ÞjX¼pBðY Þ ¼ GCi ðX ; Y ÞjX¼pPðY Þ, (B.3)
OPY ðX ; Y ÞjX¼pBðY Þ ¼ GCj ðX ; Y ÞjX¼pPðY Þ, (B.4)
and the boundary condition
lim
X=Y!0
OPðX ; Y Þ
X
¼ 0. (B.5)
Using the same change of nume´raire as above yields a restructuring policy identical
to that described in Proposition 1.Appendix C. Abnormal returns
In the absence of competition, abnormal returns to bidding shareholders at the
time of the takeover announcement are given by
ARBðtÞ ¼
1
2
½OBðX ; Y ; 1Þ  OBðX ; Y ; 1 soÞ
BðtÞ
. (C.1)
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ARBðtÞ ¼
KðaðK þ QÞ  QÞ
Q þ K 
KðaðK þ QÞ  QÞ
ð1 soÞQ þ K
ð1 soÞb
2Kbþ KðaðK þ QÞ  QÞ
Q þ K þ
KðaðK þ QÞ  QÞ
ð1 soÞQ þ K
ð1 soÞb
. (C.2)
Similarly, abnormal returns to target shareholders at the time of the takeover
announcement are given by
ARTðtÞ ¼
1
2
½OTðX ; Y ; 1Þ  OTðX ; Y ; 1 soÞ
TðtÞ
. (C.3)
Using the expression derived for the option to merge and after simpliﬁcations we get
ARTðtÞ
¼
QðK þ QÞaþ QK
Q þ K 
ð1 soÞQðK þ QÞaþ QK
ð1 soÞQ þ K
ð1 soÞb
2Qðb 1Þ þ QðK þ QÞaþ QK
Q þ K þ
ð1 soÞQðK þ QÞaþ QK
ð1 sÞQ þ K ð1 soÞ
b
.
ðC:4Þ
Using these expressions, it is immediately seen that ARTðtÞ4ARBðtÞ when KXQ:Appendix D. Timing of takeovers when a1aa2
Suppose a1aa2. Then there exists a critical point R such that if Ro ð4ÞR then
bidder 2 (1) is stronger. Consequently, the value of R at the start of the game
determines which bidder wins the takeover. In particular, assume that K1 ¼ K2,
a14a2, and o1oo2. Under these assumptions, we have
R
2 ¼ b=½o2ðb 1Þob=½o1ðb 1Þ ¼ R
1. Moreover, it can be immediately seen that
R ¼ a1  a2
a1o1  a2o2
.
We then have the two following cases:1. Suppose that the starting value of the ratio of core business valuations is lower
than R. If R
2oR, and bidder 1 is weak, then bidder 2 wins the takeover and
competition does not affect the timing or the terms of takeovers. In particular, the
takeover occurs the ﬁrst time R reaches R
2. Otherwise, competition affects the
timing and terms of takeovers. Speciﬁcally, the takeover takes place the ﬁrst time
ðRtÞtX0 reaches the threshold Rbe1 conditional on Rbe1oR, where Rbe1 is the ratio
of core business valuations for which the breakeven share of bidder 1 is equal to
the equilibrium share of the target.2. Suppose instead that the starting value of the ratio of core business valuations is
larger than R. If the takeover happens for R4R, then it takes place the ﬁrst time
ðRtÞtX0 reaches the threshold R
 ¼ min½R
1; Rbe2, where Rbe2 is the ratio of core
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equilibrium share of the target. In this equation the min function takes a value
equal to its ﬁrst argument when the losing bidder is weak and a value equal to its
second argument when the losing bidder is strong. In the latter case, competition
speeds up the takeover process and erodes the ownership stake of bidding
shareholders.
The above argument shows that when a1aa2 and min½R
2; Rbe1oR, takeovers
happen in ‘‘up’’ as well as ‘‘down’’ states, but they are undertaken by different types
of ﬁrms. In the two different regions of exercise, each ﬁrm decides on the optimal
timing, subject to the threat of competition and the premium that is demanded by the
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